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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RANDY OLSEN, by and through his Guar-
dian ad Litem, Gaylen R. Olsen, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION; THE 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION; and FLOWELL 
ELECTRICAL ASSOCIATION, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION; THE 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
COX CONSTRUCTION C O M P A N Y , 
INC., 
Third-Party Defendant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
13867 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action tor damages resulting from personal 
injuries arising out of a (instruction accident when the 
boom of a crane came in contact with uninsulated power 
lines belonging to the defendant, Flowell Electrical Com-
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pany, and the State of Utah is alleged to be liable on 
the basis of statutorjr as well as common law liability. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defrendant, State of Utah, moved for Summary 
Judgment on the basis that as a matter of law plaintiff's 
Complaint failed to state a cause of action against it. 
On the 8th day of October, 1974, the Honorable Maurice 
Harding granted the Motion and entered a Judgment in 
favor of said defendant and against the plaintiff, No 
Cause of Action. (R. 9.) Prior thereto, defendant, Flowell 
Electrical Association, Inc., filed a similar Motion, and on 
the 24th day of May, 1974, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor 
granted the Motion and entered a Judgment in favor of 
said defendant and against plaintiff, No Cause of Action. 
(R. 87, 88.) Both Judgments became final on October 8, 
1974. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the aforesaid Judgments 
of No Cause of Action and a remand of the case for a 
hearing on its merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The accident which is the subject of this cause of 
action occurred on September 6, 1972, near Meadow, 
Utah. On that date, plaintiff's employer was acting as 
the general contractor for the State of Utah for the con-
struction of Interstate 15 and was in the process of con-
structing a required southbound lane of a north to south 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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overpass. Approximately 31 feet above and to the south 
end of the overpass were electrical wires owned, con-
trolled and maintained by the defendant, Flowell Elec-
trical Association, Inc. Plaintiff's employer had planned 
to pour the cement for the concrete deck of the overpass 
by use of a concrete pump. However, on that date the 
pump had failed, so a craneJboom bucket combination, 
which had been maintained for such possibility, was be-
ing utilized. 
At the time of the accident and immediately prior 
thereto, plaintiff was engaged as a laborer for Cox Con-
struction Company and was working alongside the crane 
releasing cement for the bucket attached to the end of 
that crane's 50 foot boom when the boom inadvertently 
came in contact with the live, overhead wires. Plaintiff 
was struck by a bolt of electrical current consisting of 
14,400 volts which had passed from those wires through 
the boom and into his body. Resultant injuries included 
the amputation of both legs below the knee and severe 
burns and tissue damage to both hands and arms. 
Plaintiff's Complaint against Flowell Electrical As-
sociation, Inc., was based upon Flowell's negligence in 
maintaining live, high voltage, uninsulated wires in a 
construction area where the probability existed that a 
crane or other construction equipment could come into 
such close proximity to those wires that damage and in-
jury could result unless those wires were de-energized at 
least while such equipment was in close proximity to 
those wires. (R. 192.) 
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Taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the 
evidence shows that about a week prior to the accident 
Brent Cox, general foreman for Cox Construction Com-
pany, had contacted Ralph Robinson, the representative 
of the defendant, Flowell, and Mr. Cox and Mr. Robin-
son made a joint inspection of the construction area. 
While at that site, Robinson concluded that if the crane 
and 50 foot boom combination were to be used for pour-
ing of cement for the southbound lane of the overpass, 
the overhead electrical wires would become involved and, 
therefore, further action had to be taken. (Cox Deposi-
tion pp. 99-102.) After the accident occurred, at an in-
vestigatory hearing held by the Industrial Commission, 
Mr. Cox and Mr. Robinson appeared and testified that 
the arrangements cona^rning the lines were as follows: 
"Vance said Brent did you contact the Pbwer 
Company previous to this pour? 
Brent said yes.. 
Vance said who did you contact? 
Brent said Ralph. 
Ralph said yes he did contact me. 
Vance said is it your policy to have someone 
of your approval in the area when they are work-
ing around power lines? 
Ralph said the arrangement made was that 
Brent would contact us, Flowell Electric, when 
they were ready to have someone there and we 
would kill the line. 
Vance said did he do this? 
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Ralph said no we were never notified. 
Vance said we require workmen contact the 
utility co., gas co., or whatever the case may be. 
They must have a representative at the project 
site at the time if at all possible. If they can kill 
the line this is what we would like to have done. 
Ralph said this was the arrangement we 
made we told Brent to let us know a day ahead 
so we could schedule a man to be there until 
they were through and to shut the power off." 
(R. 42.) 
The evidence furaher showed that the reason Mr. 
Robinson was never notified of the impending use of the 
crane was because the offices in Fillmore were closed at 
the required time and Cox was unable to locate him or 
any other representative of the electrical company. (Cox 
Deposition pp. 24, 25, 32, 33, 91, 92.) 
Plaintiff's Complaint against the State of Utah was 
two-fold. First, as to the State Industrial Commission 
and second, to the State Road Commission. 
As to the Industrial Commission, the Ctomplaint 
alleged that contrary to Section 35-1-16(1), the Commis-
sion had failed to supervise this construction site and 
enforce the laws intended for the protection of the life, 
health, safety and welfare of the plaintiff. Specifically, 
that defendant allowed the general contractor to adopt 
a construction procedure which subjected the plaintiff 
to an unreasonable risk of harm, failed to direct the plain-
tiffs employer to furnish plaintiff with proper equipment 
for the work he was performing, failed to supervise the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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use of the crane to insure the safety of plaintiff and 
finally, failed to have the electrical wires of Flowell de-
energized before pennitting the crane to come in close 
proximity to those uninsulated, high voltage overhead 
wires. (R. 190.) 
The evidence taken in the light most favorable to 
plaintiff showed that the Industrial Commission was 
familiar with the provisions of the Code and that it im-
plemented the duties enumerated therein by promulgat-
ing detailed safety rules and regulations which were pub-
lished and distributed to all contractors throughout the 
State including a rule which provided that no equipment 
should come within ten feet of any electrical wires when 
working around such wires. (Gronning Deposition pp* 
5, 13.) In addition, tlie Commission maintained safety 
inspectors who were iissigned to specific areas of the 
State with directions to make periodic inspections of con-
struction sites to insure that the contractors were per-
forming their work in a safe manner and in accordance 
with the safety procedures of the Commission, and armed 
with the delegated authority to order the stoppage of any 
procedure they found which may be in violation of safety 
rules and regulations. (Gronning Deposition pp. 7, 11, 
12, 13.) 
The Commission has deputized other individuals not 
on the payroll of the Industrial Commission, under cer-
taintain circumstances, to represent the Commission in 
the enforcement of its safety rules and regulations. This 
procedure has been followed in situations where the State 
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Road Commission is involved in an extensive project 
like the one involved in this case. (Gronning Deposition 
p, 18.) In spite of this, the record reveals that the only 
time the safety inspector assigned to this area ever con-
tacted the Cox Construction Company concerning this 
project was sometime during the month of January or 
February of 1972, approximately six months before the 
accident. Further, this inspector failed to acquaint him-
self with the project or to note that the plans for the 
highway required the Cox Construction Company to be 
working beneath those uninsulated, high voltage electrical 
wires, and neither the safety inspector assigned to this 
area nor any deputized representative of the Industrial 
Commission was present at the construction site at the 
time of the accident. 
As to the State Road Commission, the Complaint 
alleged that it was the governmental agency which em-
ployed plaintiff's empbyer to perform the work engaged 
in at the time of the accident and that it was negligent 
in the manner in which it supervised the activities of 
plaintiff's employer. (R. 191.) Again, the evidence taken 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff established that 
an employee of the Road Commission, Franklyn Drew 
Rasmussen, was at the construction site in the capacity of 
not only a cement inspector but also a designated safety 
inspector. This employee was aware of the fact the lines 
were not de-energized, saw the crane being used near 
these wires, and instructed that the crane be moved. 
(Rasmussen Deposition pp. 13, 19, 24, 25.) The contrac-
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tor, after this order, did in fact move the crane. There-
after, this same employee again noticed that this hazar-
dous situation was retwuiring, so this time he personally 
went to the crane operator and told that operator that he 
was too close to the wires to be safe. However, he did 
not specify the distance the operator was to remain from 
the line, did not specify that the work should cease, and 
did not make any other suggestions other than merely 
indicating that the crane was getting too close to the 
wires. (Rasmussen Deposition p. 25.) Specifically, the 
inspector explained to the Industrial Commission after 
the accident: 
"I had become concerned about the crane 
being too close to the power line. I had them 
move it about 20 minutes before the accident 
happened. Then about one or two minutes be-
fore it happened, I asked them to move the crane 
again/' (R. 129.) 
Under the points of this brief, plaintiff will present 
in more detail the specific relationship between each de-
fendant and the basis upon which plaintiff contends the 
trial court committed error in granting the Judgments of 
No Cause of Action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANT-
ING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF DEFENDANT, FLOWELL ELECTRICAL 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ASSOCIATION, INC. AND AGAINST PLAIN-
TIFF, NO CAUSE OF ACTION. 
The defendant, Flowell Electrical Association, Inc., 
had a duty to take proper safety precautions after being 
notified that contraction was being conducted around 
their wires. The regulations of the Utah State Industrial 
Commission Section 61-2 provide as follows: 
"When it is necessary to work in close prox-
imity of power lines, the utility company which 
operates the lines shall be notified concerning 
such work. If it is deemed advisable, such lines 
may be killed. If 10 feet of clearance cannot be 
maintained, then the lines shall be killed or other 
positive safety procedures followed to prevent 
contact." 
The standard of care required by an electrical com-
pany to abide by this duty has been defined in Brigham 
v. Moon Electric Association, 29 Utah 2d 292, 470 P. 2d 
393, as follows: 
"Therefore, a high degree of duty is upon 
one who transmits electricity in high tension 
wires to see that no harm befalls a person right-
fully in proximity thereto when that person is 
himself guilty of no wrong doing. In other words, 
the highest degree of care must be used to pre-
vent harm from coming to others." 
The above statement is in conformity with the gen-
eral accepted law. In 29 C. J. S., Electricity, Section 
339, it is stated: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"It may be stated as a general rule that one 
maintaining electric wires and appliances is re-
quired to exercise such care as a reasonably pru-
dent man would exercise under the circum-
stances, or care <x>mmensurate with, or propor-
tionate to the dangers. * * * Those en-
gaged of the business of conducting electricity 
over high voltage wires are bound to exercise 
greater precaution in its use than if the prop-
erty were of less dangerous character, and are, 
therefore, bound to anticipate more remote pos-
sibilities of danger." 
In addition to the requirement of exercising a high 
degree of care, there is another principle of law which 
is applicable to this case. This principle is clearly de-
fined in 69 A. L. R. 2d 104, wherein it is stated: 
"The principle basis for determining liabil-
ity of a power company for injuries resulting 
from contact between its wires and a crane or 
other moveable machine is the foreseeability of 
a situation arising which might lead to such in-
juries. If a reasonable prudent person in the 
position of the defendant should have antici-
pated dangers to others from its installations, 
the defendant may be held liable. 
This is so, even though the exact situation 
that caused the injury may not have been reason-
ably foreseeable." 
In this regard, the record demonstrates that Flowell 
Electrical Association, Inc. was aware that the overpass 
was going to be constructed in close proximity to their 
wires, and if the crane was utilized, the height of its 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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boom exceeded the height of its electrical wires by at 
least 15 feet. The electrical company was also well aware 
of the Industrial Commission's regulation that an agent 
be at the project site anytime work was being conducted 
around the wires so that with its special expertise, it 
would be in a position to abide by the Industrial safety 
regulations and kill the lines. In addition, the company 
knew that the boom would have to be extended and that 
workmen would be required to be near the crane to han-
dle the cement bucket leading from the boom, and if that 
boom should inadvertently contact the uninsulated over-
head wires, 14,400 volts of dectridty would be discharged 
through the boom and into any person in close proximity 
to the crane. Finally, plaintiff submits that the dectrical 
company should have appreciated that with a construc-
tion project of such magnitude, any unnecessary con-
struction delay would result in a severe financial loss to 
the contractor; and, therefore, that a reasonable contrac-
tor would attempt to avoid such delay. 
Knowing these facts, Flowell still failed to maintain 
an agent at the construction site while the equipment 
was operating in the area of those wires. Further, it 
failed to "kill" the wires or make arrangements of by-
passing those wires until construction in that area had 
terminated. Instead, it selected an alternate course of 
action whereby it would kill those wires only alter being 
notified by the contractor that the boom was being used 
in the immediate area of those wires. Finally, after se-
lecting this alternate course, which plaintiff submits was 
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fraught with danger, Flowell compounded this danger 
by failing to maintain a manner which would insure that 
it could be contacted and informed when that boom was 
being moved into the immediate area of those wires. 
Plaintiff submits that a reasonable prudent person 
would have realized this alternate course, and other ac-
tion taken, created an unreasonable risk of harm to per-
sons working in proximity to those wires. I t is common 
knowledge that in this day of necessity for the construc-
tion of highways, contractors are under a duty to per-
form within a specific time and are not able to delay 
their work without severe financial repercussions. This 
is so, particularly in this area of the State where weather 
plays an important part in the determination of when 
construction work may be done, that contractors must 
take advantage of all available working hours. 
The facts demonstrated that on the date of the acci-
dent, the contractor utilized every reasonable means avail-
able to contact the agent of Flowell in order to have the 
power in Flowell's lines killed while the crane and boom 
were being used in close proximity to its wires. The con-
tractor had no way of knowing whether FlowelTs agents 
had absented themselves from the office or their homes 
for merely an hour or a day or whether their absence 
would be substantially protracted. Due to this lack of 
knowledge, the contractor did not act unpredictably in 
deciding to proceed with the eonstraction in spite of the 
possible dangers. Plaintiff respectfully submits that un-
der those facts, reasonable minds could differ as to 
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whether or not the electrical company exercised the high 
degree of care required in two major respects. 
First, in its failure to conform to the safety regula-
tions promulgated by the Utah State Industrial Commis-
sion in assigning an agent of the electrical company to 
this specific construction area in order that said agent 
could be on the job when this boom was moved under 
the wires. Plaintiff submits such requirement is not an 
unreasonable request when the facts indicate the boom 
was utilized in this area for less than one full working 
day. 
Second, in its failure, after selecting the alternate 
course, to have its offices open during reasonable work-
ing hours so that the contractor could make contact and 
inform it that the crane was working under the wires. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANT-
ING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, BY AND 
T H R O U G H ITS INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
SION, AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF, NO 
CAUSE OF ACTION. 
The defendant, Industrial Commission of Utah, had 
a statutory duty to the plaintiff in this matter arising 
under Section 35-1-16(1) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, which provides in part as follows: 
"It shall be the duty of the Commission and 
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it shall have full power^ jurisdiction and author-
ity,: 
(1) to supervise every employment and 
place of employment and to administer and en-
force all laws for the protection of the life, health, 
safety and welfare of employees." 
The responsibility of the Commission under that 
statute to see that the contractor furnishes plaintiff with 
a safe place to work was reaffirmed in the recent case of 
Peterson v. Fowler, 27 Utah 2d 159, 493 P. 2d 997 (1972). 
There the plaintiffs were dependents of an employee of 
a general contractor esngaged in the construction of the 
sports center of the University of Utah. That employee 
was killed when a scaffolding fell from the ceiling and 
the heirs brought the action against the architect and 
a number of other contractors. In affirming the Summary 
Judgment granted by the trial court as to the architect, 
this Count made reference to the cited section of the 
Code above and stated: 
"He owed no duty to the subcontractors or 
their employees in connection with the scaffold-
ing. His responsibility was to his client, the 
owner of the building, and his duty in that re-
gard was to see that the sports arena was prop-
erly erected so that it would be safe for the uses 
for which it would be put when finished. It is 
the duty of the Industrial Commission and not 
of the architect to see the contractors furnish 
their employees with safe places to work." (Em-
phasis added.) 
In spite of the clear language of the statute and the 
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reaffirmance by this Court that the Industrial Commis-
sion did in fact have a legal duty under that statute, the 
Industrial Commission still asserts that it had no duty 
to be at the construction site to supervise the area and 
insure that the site be reasonably safe for plaintiffs 
work. The Industrial Commission argues that the legis-
lature placed such a heavy burden of supervision upon 
it, that it is impossible for its agents to perform their 
delegated duties, and for that reason, it cannot be held 
liable for any injury which may result from its failure 
to meet that burden. 
It is not unusual for the legislature, however, to 
place such a general and broad duty of supervision upon 
a governmental agency created expressly for the purpose 
of protecting persons in this State who are without any 
means of protecting themselves. For example, the legis-
lature has delegated such broad responsibility to the Utah 
State Road Commission under section 27-12-8 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, which provides in part: 
"The commission shall have the following powers 
and duties in addition to such other powers and 
duties as may be provided by law: 
* * * 
(5) To adopt such regulations governing 
the use by the public of state highways as may 
be necessary to provide for public safety and 
against undue use of the state highways. 
(6) To provide for highway safety under 
the direction of a qualified highway safety en-
gineer whose duty it shall be to conduct high-
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way safety surveys and locate, designate and rec-
ommend the removal by the state road commis-
sion of highway hazards to safety." 
This is not merely a product of recent legislatures 
either. Ptor example, during the 1919 session the Legis-
lature enacted a statute delegating to the county govern-
mental agencies the broad and general responsibility of 
maintaining all roads within the county. That statute 
provided: 
Laws of Utah, 1919, Chapter 55, Section 2823 
"The County Road Commissioner, where ap-
pointed, under the direction and supervision of 
the Board of County Commissioners shall: 
1. Take charge of the public roads within 
the county, and employ and direct such compe-
tent help as may be necessary to properly per-
form his duties." 
The legal effect of the statute and its application 
to a specific case was considered by this Court in Rom-
ney v. Lynch, 58 Utah 479, 199 P. 974 (1921). In that 
case the defendant was a general contractor for the State 
Road Commission in the construction of a State highway 
between Salt Lake City and Ogden, Utah. Pursuant to 
the terms of his contract, the defendant was required to 
provide a detour over a dedicated Davis County road. 
Plaintiff, while traveling by automobile, followed the 
direction of the defendant by taking that detour and, 
thereafter, while attempting to pass another automobile, 
an accident occurred which plaintiff claimed was due 
to the defective and dangerous condition of that detour. 
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Plaintiff alleged that defendant^ as the contractor, had 
selected the detour and was responsible for the accident 
because of the unsafe detour road. A demiurrer to the 
Complaint was granted by the trial court, and this court 
affirmed, emphasizing: 
"Under the provisions of Comp. Laws Utah 
1917, §§ 2800, 5848, subd. 15, the Davis County 
road, on which the accident of which plaintiff 
complains occurred, is deemed a public highway. 
As such it was under the direction and super-
vision of the county commissioners of Davis 
county and it was the duty of said commission-
ers to keep the road clear of obstructions and 
in good repair. Section 2823, as amended by Laws 
Utah 1919, c. 55. 
It is therefore difficult to conceive upon 
what theory the defendant might be held to re-
spond in damages for failure to keep in good 
repair the public road or highway in question. 
* * * 
If any legal duty, express or implied, under 
the facts pleaded in plaintiff's complaint, rested 
upon the defendant to maintain the Davis county 
road reasonably safe for travel, then we have 
indeed entered upon a new field of personal lia-
bilities for judicial investigation and determina-
tion. 
Let it be conceded, as was contention made 
by the plaintiff, that defendant by his acts in 
closing the Clearfield-Siinset Highway and direct-
ing travel to the Davis county road thereby 
adopted the latter as a detour, then as a mat-
ter of law we think defendant had a right to 
use it for that purpose without assuming the re-
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sponsibilities that rested upon the county com-
missioners of Davis county of properly maintain-
ing it. If the public highways of this state are 
open and presumed to be reasonably safe for the 
legitimate use of all citizens alike, then what 
good reason can be assigned why a contractor 
may not properly and rightfully avail himself 
of their use as a detour for the traveling public 
while he is engaged in the performance of work, 
such as the defendant here was undertaking to 
do, without having visited upon him the results 
occasioned by the negligence of the officials 
whose plain statutory duty it was to properly 
maintain them?" 
Although no decision has been rendered by this Court 
since the passage of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act in 1965 construing the similar language contained in 
section 27-12-8, supra, that basis of liability does not 
appear to have been removed by this Court. 
A reasonable basis upon which the legislature could 
have imposed such a duty upon the Industrial Commis-
sion does, therefore, exist. If it were determined that 
the defendant performed its duty in a negligent manner, 
a reasonable basis exists upon which liability could be 
imposed. Plaintiff contends that under the facte of the 
case at bar, reasonable minds could determine that this 
duty was negligently performed. 
As previously noted, the contract between the State 
and Cox Construction Company was executed during the 
month of November, 1972, and a safety inspector was 
assigned to the section of the highway to be constructed 
by Cox Construction Company. The evidence established 
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that this safety inspector, Mr. Vance Abbott, made only 
one contact with Cox Cooostniction Company in February 
of 1973, when he discussed with the general foreman the 
commission safety rules and regulations. On the date 
of that meeting, however, the construction company had 
not even commenced work. That inspector failed to ex-
amine the plans and specifications so as to determine if 
there were any areas where hazardous and dangerous 
conditions might exist for the employees of Cox Construc-
tion Company. In addition, that inspector failed to de-
termine if the pending construction of the highway neces-
sitated employees of Cox Construction Company to be 
engaged in work in close proximity to uninsulated elec-
trical wires with either a crane or other equipment, Fin-
anlly, on the date of the accident, the safety inspector 
was not even aware of the location of the Cox Construc-
tion Company or that the company was building an over-
pass directly underneath high voltage uninsulated elec-
trical wires. The sole excuse for the failure of this in-
spector to make inspections after the inspection of Feb-
ruary, 1973, was the work load required of him. 
Finally, to insure that sufficient inspectors were avail-
able to see that the contractor furnished its employees 
with a safe place to work, the Commission has, in similar 
situations, deputized other employees at the site to per-
form the duties of a duly appointed safety inspector. 
However, that procedure was not ever followed in this 
case. 
Plaintiff contends that the above facts, considered in 
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light of this paitiailar accident, clearly indicate that 
reasonable minds could determine that the Industrial 
Commission failed to properly discharge its duty. 
Plaintiff respectfully contends, therefore, that the 
trial court eired in granting the defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and entering a Judgment in favor 
of the defendant, State of Utah, and against the plain-
tiff, No Cause of Action. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANT-
ING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF THE S T A T E O F U T A H , BY AND 
THROUGH ITS ROAD COMMISSION AND 
AGAINST PLAINTIFF, NO CAUSE OF AC-
TION. 
As previously stated, the liability of the State Road 
Commission was alleged on the basis of the failure of its 
safety inspector to exercise reasonable care after becom-
ing aware that plaintiff was being exposed to the danger-
ous and hazardous situation of working in close proxim-
ity to overhead electrical wires which were not de-ener-
gized. Mr. F. Drew Rasmussen, as the employee of the 
Utah State Road Commission, was assigned to the Cox 
Construction project in the dual capacity of a cement 
inspector and a safety inspector. He knew that when 
the crane-bucket combination was utilized for the pouring 
of cement, that the overhead wires of the defendant, 
Flowell Company, were not de-enecrgized, and as the work 
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progressed, realized that no specific employee had been 
assigned to the duty of controlling the distance between 
the crane and the overhead wires. 
The evidence demonstrated that at one time when 
the danger became acutely obvious, he ordered the fore-
man to have the crane moved. Sometime after the crane 
had been moved in accordance with his orders, this in-
spector again noticed that the crane operator was not 
maintaining a proper clearance, and this time, instead of 
going to the foreman, he went directly to the crane oper-
ator to register his complaint. This time, however, neither 
the crane operator nor the foreman followed his instruc-
tions or heeded his warnings, and the boom was allowed 
to come in contact with the wires releasing the electricity 
and subsequently injuring the plaintiff. 
It is the position of the plaintiff that when Rasmus-
sen, as an agent of the Road Commission and acting 
within the scope of his employment, undertook to con-
trol the movement of the crane, that he was under a duty 
to perform that undertaking in a reasonable, prudent 
manner; and if he failed to do so, that failure would con-
stitute a basis for liability for resulting damages. This 
reasoning is confirmed by numerous authorities which 
have addressed themselves to the fact that any person 
who, for whatever reason, assumes to perform a duty, 
although that duty may not be specifically delegated to 
him, must exercise that duty with due care. 
Restatement of Torts, Second, explains this concept 
Under Section 323, which provides: 
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"One who undertakes, gratuitously or for con-
sideration, to render services to another which 
he should recognize as necessary for the protec-
tion of the other's parson or things, is subject 
to liability to the other for physical harm result-
ing from his failure to exercise reasonable care 
to perform his undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases 
the risk of such harm, or 
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's 
reliance upon the undertaking." 
And, again, at Stetion 324 A: 
"One who undertakes, gratuitously or for con-
sideration, to render services to another which 
he should recognize as necessary for the protec-
tion of a third person or his things, is subject to 
liability to the third person for physical harm 
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable 
care to protect his undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care in-
creases the risk of such harm, or 
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed 
by the other to the third person, or 
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of 
the other or the third person upon the under-
taking." 
In Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61, 
76 S. Ct. 122, 100 L. Ed. 48, the United States had un-
dertaken to maintain a lighthouse, had not acted with 
due care in so doing, and plaintiff's ship was damaged 
as a result. In explaining the consequences of such an 
undertaking, the court; explained: 
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"[I]t is hornbook tort law that one who under-
takes to warn the public of danger and thereby 
induces reliance must perform his 'good Samari-
tan' task in a careful manner. * * * The 
Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse 
service. But once it exercised its discretion to 
operate a light on Chandeleur Island and en-
gendered reliance on the guidance afforded by 
the light, it was obligated to use due care to 
make certain that the light was kept in good 
working order; and, if the light did become ex-
tinguished, then the Coast Guard was further 
obligated to use due care to discover this fact 
and to repair the light or give warning that it 
was not functioning. If ifae Coast Guard failed 
in its duty and damage was thereby caused to 
petitioners, the United States is liable under the 
Tort Claims Act." 
There have also been a series of cases recently in 
which compensation insurance carriers who voluntarily 
undertook to perform safety inspections and negligently 
performed those inspections on the employer's premises 
have been found to be answerable for such negligence 
as third parties. 
See Ray v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 10 Mich. App. 
55 158 N. W. 2d 786; Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 
31 111. 2d 69, 199 N. E. 2d 769, revg. 39 111. App. 2d 73, 
187 N. E. 2d 425; Bryant v. Old Republic Ins. Co., (C. A. 
6 Ky.) 431 F. 2d 1385; and the similar cases cited in 93 
A. L. R. 2d 598. 
In such cases, the Courts have refused to impose 
liability on the basis of the statutory construction of their 
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specific Workmen's Compensation Acts. However, even 
in those cases, the Courts have emphasized that any 
"bona fide" third party who voluntarily undertook to 
perform safety inspections would be liable therefore if 
the inspection is negligently performed. 
Thus, in this case a jury could well find that Ras-
mussen, as an employee of the State Road Commission, 
in properly discharging his duty, should have either 
stopped the contractor or continued his supervision of 
the operation of the crane. Had he done so, this case 
would never have been brought before this Court. Plain-
tiff, therefore, respectfully submits that it is clear that 
the trial court erred in dismissing the Complaint as 
against the State of Utah and entering a Judgment of 
No Cause of Action. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
THAT THE NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFFS 
EMPLOYER WAS THE SOLE, PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
Defendants have contended throughout this trial that 
even if sufficient evidence were to be shown to support 
a finding of negligence on their part, that plaintiff would 
still not be entitled to any recovery because the action 
of the crane operator in coming in contact with the wires 
was the sole, proximate cause of the accident. Defendants 
have claimed that the earlier derision of this Court in 
Toma v. Utah Power and Light Company, 12 Utah 2d 
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278, 365 P. 2d 788 (1961), is controlling since that deci-
sion held that the action of the crane operator was, as 
a matter of law, the sole, proximate cause of the accident. 
Plaintiff contends that the decision rendered in the Toma 
case, supra, must be confined to the facts of that case 
and has no application in the case at bar. Further, a care-
ful analysis of the facts and law involved indicates that 
the conduct of the crane operator in the case at bar was 
nothing more than a contributing cause, and, therefore, 
an issue of fact is presented regarding causation. 
In the Toma case, supra, the record was clear that 
the electrical company, prior to the accident, had cooper-
ated with the contractor in having the doctrical current 
well under control before any construction work was per-
formed in close proximity to the wires. Also in the Toma 
case the record indicated that all parties involved were 
fully aware of the construction area, the proximity of the 
wires to the construction work, the nature and type of 
equipment being used, and that the power company had 
left their telephone number to be contacted, if necessary. 
On the basis of these facts, the lower court, in the Toma 
case granted a Motion for a Directed Verdict. This Court, 
in affirming that ruling, held there was an issue of negli-
gence but ruled that the subsequent negligence on the 
part of the crane operator was the sole, proximate cause. 
This Court held: 
"Proximate cause has been defined as the 
cause next in relation to cause and effect. That 
which in natural sequence, unbroken by any effi-
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cient, intervening cause produces the injury, and 
without which the result would not have oc-
curred. That which is nearest in the order of 
causation. The last negligent act contributory 
to an injury without which such injury would 
not have resulted. The dominant cause, tine mov-
ing or producing cause, this cause may be an act 
or omission. Proximate cause may be distin-
guished from immediate cause. The immediate 
cause is generally referred to in the law as the 
nearest cause in point of time and space, while 
the act or omission may be the proximate cause 
of an injury without being the immediate cause. 
The proximate cause may be more remote in time 
or space but closer to the result and is the re-
sponsible cause. When the causes are indepen-
dent of each other, the nearest is, of course, to 
be charged with the accident and resultant in-
jury. 
In the Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co. 
case we held: 
"More than one separate act of negli-
gence, even though they do not happen sim-
ultaneously, may be proximate causes of an 
injury. * * * When one does an act or 
omits to take a precaution and under the 
circumstances, as an ordinary prudent per-
son, he ought reasonably to foresee that his 
act or omission will thereby expose inter-
ests of another to unreasonable risk of harm 
such person may be liable for resulting in-
juries caused by any reasonable foreseeable 
conduct whether it be innocent, negligent or 
even criminal. * * * 
"One cannot excuse himself from lia-
bility arising f roan his negligent acts merely 
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because the later negligence of another con-
curs to cause an injury, if the later act was 
a legally foreseeable event. 
"Where one has negligently caused a 
dangerous situation and a later actor ob-
serves or circumstances are such that he can-
not fail to observe, such condition, but later 
actor negligently failed to avoid it, as a mat-
ter of law, the later intervening act inter-
rupts the natural sequence of events and 
cute off the legal effect of the negligence of 
the initial actor but if conduct of later inter-
vening actor is such that he negligently fails 
to observe a dangerous condition until it is 
too late to avoid it, question whether later 
intervening act supersedes negligence of in-
itial actor is for jury." 
Strenuous efforts have been repeatedly made 
to have us reverse or at least modify the Hill-
yard case, particularly as it has to do with the 
determination of when proximate cause becomes 
a jury question. It has been vigorously argued 
that this case imposes a severe and unreasonable 
burden upon the plaintiff, and works a grave in-
justice upon an innocent injured person. The in-
jured person is often stopped from holding re-
sponsible one joint tort feasor while prevailing 
against the other. Regardless of these many 
efforts we have consistently upheld our decision 
in the Hillyard case." 
In short, Toma was not a new concept but merely 
a reaffirmance by this Court of their earlier HUlyard 
decision. However, under HUlyard, in order for the sub-
sequent negligent conduct to be the sole, proximate cause 
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of the accident, such conduct must meet the test of be-
ing an independent intervening cause. The Toma deci-
sion made no specific reference to the fact that the ac-
tion by that crane operator was an independent, inter-
vening cause; and, in fact, that legal concept was never 
discussed in the majority decision. However, Hillyard 
clearly discussed this matter and established that in 
order for the conduct of the second actor to be an inde-
pendent, intervening cause, his act must not have been 
foreseeable by the original negligent person. In apply-
ing this to the case at bar, plaintiff contends that it was 
reasonably foreseeable on the part of both the Flowell 
Power Company and the Staite of Utah that even if the 
lines were not de-energized, plaintiff's employer would 
still continue to perform the construction work under 
the wires. This differs from the facts of Toma where 
there was no basis for holding that even if the power 
company negligently refused to cut the power lines, that 
the contractor would continue its construction work near 
the wires. The evidence was very clear that the contrac-
tor in that case did not proceed with any construction 
work without having first requested that the lines be 
de-energized, and the power company left its telephone 
numbers for any emergencies and remained available. 
In the case at bar, however, the representative of 
the power company, when he made his personal inspec-
tion of the property, observed that the contractor had 
performed a considerable amount of the construction 
work under the wires before the company was contacted. 
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Further, the instructions given by the Flowell represen-
tative to the contractor wore to the effect that, "When 
you start using the crane, get in touch with us, and if 
necessary, we can make arrangements to kill the lines." 
Certainly a jury could find that under the circumstances 
in the case at bar* it was foreseeable that if Flowell was 
not contacted, that the work would still continue and a 
crane operator might inadvertently come in contact with 
the live wires and some damage could result. 
This concept of foreseeability as to the action by 
someone operating a crane under overhead wires is gen-
erally considered the crux of any case where the crane 
comes in contact with the wires. 
Thcere is an extensive annotation on this matter 
in 69 A. L R. 2d 93. At Section 20 of this annotate, 
there are a number of cases which discuss this matter, 
and the annotation states that the general rule is as 
follows: 
"It has frequently been contended that a 
power company, even though it may have been 
negligent in some respects in regard to installa-
tion or maintenance of its wires, is not liable for 
injuries resulting from a contact between mov-
able machinery and a power wire, on the theory 
that the power company's negligence was merely 
a condition and not a cause, and that the inter-
vening negligence of someone else, generally the 
operator of the machinery, in making the con-
tact,, was the actual cause of the injury. 
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The fact that there was intervening negli-
gence of someone other than the power company 
which may have contributed to the accident will 
not in itself bar recovery aginst the power com-
pany if such an intervening act could have been 
reasonably foreseen. 
Furthermore, even where an accident has 
been caused by the intervening act of a third 
party, a power company may be held liable if it 
fails seasonably to correct the situation created 
by such intervening negligence, with the result 
that another accident occurs. See Reardon v. 
Florida West Coast Power Corp. (1929) 97 Fla. 
314, 120 So. 842, supra, § 11. 
But nonliability on the basis of intervening 
cause has usually been upheld if the interven-
ing negligence act is of such a nature as not to 
bereasonably foreseeable by the power company, 
and if it has no relationship to the company's 
negligence." 
Plaintiff respectfully submite that the foregoing clear-
ly indicates there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether 
the subsequent action of the crane operator was a con-
curring cause of the accident. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that as to each of the 
named defendants in this case, the record has established 
issues of fact which can only be resolved by a jury trial. 
Plaintiff contends that in view of the foregoing, that 
this Honorable Court should reverse the decisions grant-
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ing defendants a Judgment of No Cause of Action and 
remand this case to the District Court for a hearing on 
the merits. 
R^pectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, ROBERTS 
& BLACK 
By Richard C. Dibblee 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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